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Abstract
The first chapter of this dissertation identifies the decline in mortality risk as an important
trigger of demographic transition. To that end, we solve a precautionary demand for fertility model
to fit the time series of total fertility rate and average years of schooling in the labor force for the
16 rich countries. Overall, the time series of fertility and average years of schooling for individuals
in the labor force generated by our model closely match the actual observations. Furthermore, the
out-of-sample prediction of output per worker are also highly correlated with the data. Using the
model, we also identify a temporary decline in the price of housing space as the leading cause of
baby booms across these countries.
The second chapter employs machine learning techniques to capture heterogeneity in free
trade agreements. The tools of machine learning allow us to quantify several features of trade
agreements, including volume, comprehensiveness, and legal enforceability. Combining machine
learning results with gravity analysis of trade, we find that more comprehensive agreements result
in larger trade creation effects. In addition, we identify the specific trade policy provisions that tend
to have the substantial effect in creating trade flows. In particular, legally binding provisions on
anti-dumping, capital mobility, competition, customs harmonization, dispute settlement mechanism,
e-commerce, environmental standards, export restrictions, freedom of transit, import restrictions,
institutional arrangements, intellectual property rights, investment, labor standards, public pro-
curement, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, services, subsidies and countervailing measures,
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Chapter 1
Fertility, Human Capital, and
Economic Growth: International
Evidence (with Dr. Robert
Tamura)
1.1 Introduction
During the last two centuries, most parts of the world experienced a dramatic decline in
fertility for the first time, a phenomenon collectively known as demographic transition. Beginning
with wealthier nations in the late nineteenth century, the middle-income and low-income countries
began to experience similar dramatic declines in fertility and mortality in the middle and late
twentieth century, respectively. For example, on average, women from Western countries had a
fertility rate of 2.5 in 1928. By 1960, Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe reached
that same rate. By the early twenty-first century, most countries in every region of the world except
for North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa reached the fertility rate of 2.5. During the same period,
the majority of countries also experienced a sustained growth in output per capita for the first
time in history. Therefore, understanding the triggers of demographic transition and the role of
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demographic transition in generating economic transition is an important question in the field of
economic growth. This paper provides empirical support for the role of declining mortality risk in
generating demographic transition across 16 rich countries.
This paper makes two important contributions. First, this paper presents a mechanism
through which the decline in mortality risk leads to a fall in fertility and a corresponding rise in
human capital accumulation. When mortality risk is high, the uncertainty of child survival gives
rise to “hoarding” of children motive for parents. As mortality risk declines, parents reduce their
precautionary demand for children, which in turn lowers the price for child quality. This allows
parents to invest more resources per child leading to an accelerated accumulation of human capital.
Using this particular mechanism, we explain the secular decline in fertility as well as a secular rise
in human capital observed across the rich countries in our sample.
Second, as in Tamura and Simon (2017) we attribute baby booms to a fall in the price of
housing space. Similarly, we identify fall in the cost of schooling to explain the ostensibly paradoxical
rise in the years of schooling observed during the baby boom years. This phenomenon runs counter
to the quality-quantity trade-off highlighted by Becker and Lewis (1973) because as the quantity
of children increases, the price of child quality rises, which in turn would imply a reduction in the
average years of schooling. By calibrating an endogenous model of fertility and human capital to
fit the observed series of fertility and average years of schooling for 16 rich countries, we identify
a temporary decline in the price of housing space, along with a fall in the cost of schooling, as a
possible explanation for the phenomenon.
Murphy, Simon, and Tamura (2008) use this same precautionary model of fertility to fit the
differential baby booms and the rising level of schooling attainment across US states by allowing
the price of housing space and the cost of schooling to vary over time. The time-varying price series
of housing space chosen to fit the data on fertility and years of schooling closely fits the average
population densities of the US states during the same period. Similarly, Tamura and Simon (2017)
use the same precautionary model to fit the time series of fertility and years of schooling for 21 OECD
countries for the last two centuries. They also find strong empirical support for the time-series of
calibrated cost of schooling when they use historical data on education expenditures as a share of
GDP to proxy for the cost of schooling in these countries.1 Overall, both our model-generated
1Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016) use a similar model of precautionary fertility to explain black and white
fertility and years of schooling for 1800 (1820 for black) to 2000 at the U.S. state level.
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series of fertility and our model-generated series of average years of schooling closely match the
corresponding data, and our out-of-sample predictions of real output per worker are also highly
correlated with the data.
In Section 1.2, we present literature review on studies on fertility, human capital, and baby
booms. Section 1.3 presents the model, and the calibration procedure. Section 1.4 explains data
sources. Section 1.5 presents a brief discussion of the data on fertility, mortality and years of
schooling used to calibrate the model. Section 1.6 presents our calibration results and goodness of
fits results, and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Existing Theories of Fertility and Economic Growth
Prior to Becker (1960), economists considered fertility to be outside the scope of economics.
This was mainly because earlier studies that did not control for the differential knowledge of con-
traceptives among parents had found either a negative or no relationship between family income
and fertility (Becker (1960)). By modeling children as consumer durables and by introducing child
quality into parent’s utility function, Becker (1960) shows that the demand for children (quantity)
and child quality rise with income.
Becker and Barro (1988) link fertility choice to the theory of economic growth. They analyze
fertility within an intergenerational model in which altruistic parents derive utility from the number
of children as well as the utility of children. The theory suggests that fertility should be positively
related to interest rates. They use this framework to account for the fall and rise of fertility during
the Great Depression and the post-war baby boom in the United States.
Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990) link the dynastic Becker and Barro (1988) fertility
model with human capital. By assuming that parents’ discount rate on per capita consumption
of future generations is negatively related to fertility and that the rate of return on investment in
human capital is increasing in its stock, Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990) show that there exists
two distinct development regimes. The first is a “Malthusian” regime characterized by low levels of
human capital investment and high levels of fertility. The second regime is a “Development” regime
where parents choose low levels of fertility and make high levels of human capital investment. By
putting human capital at its core, the model was successful in jointly explaining low fertility and
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high rates of economic growth, typical of modern economies.
Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990) motivated a stream of literature that examine the
triggers of transition from “Malthusian” regimes to “Development” regimes. Galor and Weil (1998)
present a “unified” endogenous growth model in which the economy endogenously evolves to a
Development regime from a Malthusian regime. In the first stage, Malthusian phase, technological
progress is very slow, and advancements in technology leads to a proportional increases in output
and population. Due to the positive relationship between population and technological progress in
the Malthusian phase, technological progress gradually rises and leads to an increase in the rate
of return on human capital. The rise in return to human capital encourages parents to increase
investment in human capital of their children, which in turn accelerates technological progress and
generates a virtuous circle. This cycle ultimately induces demographic transition and a state of
sustained economic growth.
Galor and Moav (2002) present an interesting hypothesis that the evolutionary pressures
played a vital role in the transition from stagnation to growth. They argue that natural selection
gradually reshaped the composition of the population in a way in which off-springs carryover the
traits that are conducive to higher levels of income. In essence, natural selection caused an increase
in the representation of traits such as preferences for child quality over quantity that ultimately
triggered the demographic transition.
1.2.2 Literature Review on Baby Booms
One of the interesting fertility dynamics in the last century is the occurrences of baby booms
in many parts of the world. There are several explanations put forward for baby booms and baby
busts in the literature. Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005) identify the invention of
labor-saving household capital, such as modern appliances that decreased the cost of fertility during
the middle of the century, caused the baby boom in the United States and other Western countries.
Doepke, Hazan, and Maoz (2015) show that the increased demand for female labor in World War
II was the main reason for baby boom in the United States. The female workers, who replaced
male workers in the labor market while the male workers were fighting the war, continued to work
even long after the war. When the younger women entered the labor market, they faced increased
competition from the older and more experienced female workers. With bleak prospects in the labor
market, the younger female cohorts opted to marry earlier and bore more children instead.
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These existing explanations for the cause of baby booms experienced by the United States
and other Western countries may not be applicable for all countries in the world. Countries that
did not actively participate in the Second World War such as India, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Myanmar,
and Cambodia also experienced baby booms and rising educational achievements during their baby
boom years. In addition, the argument that the invention of labor-saving appliances decreased the
cost of fertility does not explain baby booms in countries that had very little access to electricity.
According to the World Bank, only 43% of Indians had access to electricity in 1990s, which is the
earliest electrification data publicly available for India World Bank Group. Electrification rates
would have been much lower during the 1940s and 1950s when India experienced its baby boom.
Albanesi and Olivetti (2014) is the only paper that presents a model capable of explaining
baby booms and concurrent rising educational achievements due to the fall in maternal mortality
rate that may be applicable to many countries in the world. They show that the differential declines
in maternal mortality across countries, as well as the differential timing of the decline, are consistent
with the differential magnitudes and timing of international baby booms.
In this paper, we present a model that jointly explains these fertility dynamics, human
capital accumulation and real output per worker in 16 countries. As in Tamura (2006), Murphy,
Simon, and Tamura (2008) and Tamura and Simon (2017), we identify secularly declining young-
adult mortality as the primary source of demographic transition. However, unlike the existing
literature on baby booms, we identify a falling price for housing space as the leading cause of the
baby boom and a falling cost of schooling as the source of rise in schooling during the baby boom
years. Overall, the model can fit the data on fertility and average years of schooling in the labor force,
and also serves to identify the time series of the price of housing space and the cost of schooling. In
addition, our model generates data on real output per worker which are highly correlated to actual
observations on real output per worker in the 16 countries.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Parental Preferences
A person lives up to 2 periods and each period is 40 years in length. Parents make decisions
in the face of infant mortality and young mortality, death before age 35. A child who survives the
first period is assumed to live completely through the second period. Parents choose gross fertility,
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xt, a composite consumption good, ct, the amount of housing space for each child, St, and the
”quality” of each child in terms of the level of human capital investment, τt, conditional on parental
human capital stock, ht, the probability of young-adult mortality, δt, the price of living space rt,
and the cost of schooling κt.











[(1− δt)xt − a] (1− δt)ε
, (1.1)
where ψ represents the expenditure share between consumption and housing space. We assume that
parents only care about net fertility, (1− δt)xt−a, and in order to ensure a lower bound on fertility,
we impose a ≥ 0. The last term, where ε > 0, captures the precautionary demand for fertility, similar
to Kalemli-Ozcan (2002, 2003), and Tamura (2006), and the pair (νt,βt) represents preferences on
the precautionary demand for children. During times of high mortality, parents have more children
than necessary to produce the desired number of survivors. 2 As young-adult mortality rate declines,
parents’ precautionary demand for children falls, and in the limit where mortality goes to zero, the
precautionary demand goes to zero as well.
1.3.2 The Parental Budget Constraint
The budget constraint facing a typical parent is given by
ct + rtxtSt = ht [1− xt (θ + κtτt)] , (1.2)
where θ is the fixed time cost of raising each child, τt is the time spent educating children, κt is the
efficiency of education time, and rt is the price per unit of space. Parents divide their time between
the labor market and raising children. We also assume that parents choose the size of housing, St,
and gross fertility, xt, at the same time.
1.3.3 Human Capital Accumulation Technology
The human capital of the next generation is related to parental human capital, ht, human
capital investment, τt, and the frontier human capital in the world, ht. The evolution of human
2These preferences were used in Tamura and Simon (2017) and are similar to those in Tamura et al. (2016). When
young-adult mortality is zero, the preferences in this paper are identical to those in Tamura et al. (2016).
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The functional form of the international spillover parameter, ρt, is given by




where τ t is the average parental time spent in educating each child. As long as the years of schooling
is positive and the spillover parameter is positive (ρt > 0) , the children can access and benefit
from the state-of-the-art human capital in the world. The international spillover is maximized at
τ = .38125 or at 15.25 years of schooling for a 40 year period. This human capital accumulation
technology is similar to Tamura (2006) and Tamura, Simon, and Murphy (2016). We are assuming
U.S. to be the frontier human capital country, so that ht for all countries is equal to the human
capital level of the US in year t.
1.3.4 Model Solution
We substitute (1.3) and (1.2) into (1.1) and differentiate to produce the three Euler equations


















t [(1− δt)xt − a]
1−ϕ
[ht [θ + κtτt] + rtSt]
= (1− ϕ)αcψϕt S
(1−ψ)ϕ











t [(1− δt)xt − a]
1−ϕ
rtxt
= α (1− ψ)ϕcψϕt S
(1−ψ)ϕ−1











Substituting this relationship into the budget constraint (1.2) produces
rtxtSt = (1− ψ)ht [1− xt (θ + κtτt)] . (1.9)














(1−δt)ε [(1− δt)xt − a]
−1
 . (1.10)
The budget constraint is non-convex in this setup because fertility interacts with both
housing space and human capital. Hence, we cannot obtain analytical comparative statics results.
Instead, we employ numerical solution methods to solve the problem. As in Tamura (2006), Tamura,
Simon, and Murphy (2016), and Tamura and Simon (2017), we take advantage of the fact that for
given fertility, x, the problem is globally concave in (c, S, τ). Therefore, we use a grid over possible
values of fertility, ranging from a minimum of a1−δt to the biological maximum of
1
θ , solve for the
optimal human capital investment for each level of fertility, and choose the level of fertility that
yields the highest utility.
We solved the model annually and produced fertility and human capital investment for that
birth cohort. Section 1.4 describes the procedure to compute human capital and years of schooling in
the labor force. We allow the taste parameter pair (βt, νt), rental rate (rt), and schooling efficiency
parameter (κt), to vary with time for each country in order to fit total fertility rate (xit) and average
years of schooling in the labor force in time t.
1.3.5 Stationary Values
In this section we examine the stationary solution. We assume that the stationary fertility
rate is 1. Examining the Euler equation with respect to fertility when mortality risk is 0, the
parameter restriction on a as a function of the stationary human capital investment rate, τ , and
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other parameters of the model is given by
a = 1− (1− ϕ) (1− [θ + τ ])
ϕ (1− ψ (1− [θ + τ ]))
. (1.11)














Under the balanced growth path, the frontier human capital, ht, is equal to ht, and the right hand
side of (1.12) is constant. With these parameter restrictions and long run mortality of 0, the long
run fertility rate, x, will be 1, and the long run human capital investment rate will be τ .
Table 1.1 contains the calibrated parameters in the model. The choices are standard. For
example, our choice of fixed time cost of rearing a child, θ = 0.125, is consistent with a biological
maximum fertility of 8 in an asexual model. So, for a 40 year period a child is 5 years old when
he or she enters school. Our choice of τ = 0.38125 implies a steady state value of 15.25 years of
schooling. The average years of schooling in our sample countries in 2010 is 14.0 years, and the
maximum years of schooling is 15.2 years of schooling. Similarly, our choice of r is the average
white population density of U.S. states in the year 2000, where the states are weighted by their
2000 white populations as in Murphy, Simon, and Tamura (2008). Similarly, the choice of (A,µ)
is consistent with an annualized growth rate of about 1.80% along the balance growth path. The
choice of parameters (θ, ψ) along with the long run values of fertility, x, of 1 and human capital
investment, τ , of 0.38125 (15.25 years of schooling), and the assumed stationary value of the cost
of schooling κ of 1, imply a stationary expenditure share of housing of about 19%. The housing
expenditure share reported in the OECD Better Life Index is 19.3% for the US in 2016, and 21.3%
for rest of the 15 countries in our sample. Thus, for both the US and for the 15 other rich countries,
the model parameters calibration match the data very well.
1.3.6 Calibration Procedure
In this section, we briefly discuss our calibration procedure. For each country i, we allow
the preference pair (βt, νt), rental price, rt, and educational efficiency, κt , to vary in year t in order
to jointly fit the data on total fertility rate, xit and average years of schooling in the labor force.
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We follow a two step procedure to fit fertility and schooling. First, we allow the price of space rt
and βt to vary to match fertility. Since the preference pair (νt and βt) is not separately identified,
we impose a constant νt value of .4 for the years 1950-2000 for all countries. Second, we search for
κt to match years of schooling. There was some feedback from changing κts on fertility. In the case
of enough feedback, we return to search for the preference pair (βt, νt) to match fertility for the κ
that matched the years of schooling in the labor force. Then, we return to adjust our κ to match
schooling. This iterative procedure converged to price of housing space, rt, preference pair,(νt,βt),
and cost of schooling, κt, that fit both schooling and fertility in a given year t.
Figures 1.1 to 1.16 present the actual observations and model solutions for both models for
children ever born, years of schooling in the labor force, schooling of the youngest cohort and output
per worker for the 16 rich countries. The countries included in this study are Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Newzealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, United States, and United Kingdom.
1.4 Data
The data on output per worker, young schooling, and average schooling in the labor force
come from Tamura et al. (2019). The data on mortality come from Tamura (2006). The data on
fertility come from Tamura and Simon (2017).
1.4.1 Young-Adult Mortality Risk δ
We specify young-adult mortality δ as the sum of probability of dying between the ages of 1
and 35, p1,35 plus one-third of infant mortality rate,
m
3 . We weigh down the effect of infant mortality
by a third because an infant death is less costly to replace than a child death, say at age 14. The
reasons are twofold. First, parents would have already made significant human capital investment
for 14 years. Second, a large proportion of mother’s child bearing age would have disappeared by
the death of the child at age 14. It is hard to replace the child for the parents.
We calculate the probability of dying between ages of 1 and 35 using Kaplan Maier survival




[1− P (i)], (1.13)
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where 1-P(i) denotes the Kaplan-Maier estimation for survival probability at age class i, and i
denotes the following age classes: 1-5, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-35. For years prior to 1950
for which data were not available, we extrapolate infant mortality rate and probability of dying
between the ages of 1 and 35 by regressing the log of the probability on year and year squared. Thus
we set





For total fertility rate and schooling of cohort t, we compare the model solutions in year
t with actual observation in year t. For years of schooling in the labor force and real output per
worker, we solve the model annually for each country and aggregate the model solutions for 40 years
to arrive at the measures of these variables in the labor force.
What follows is the discussion of the methodology to arrive at years of schooling in the
labor force and human capital in the labor force from model solutions of human capital and years
of schooling for birth cohort born in year t. Since each period is 40 years in length, if a child enter
school at year t, the child has already been reared for 40θ = 5 years. The child enters the labor force
25 years after birth and works for 40 years before retiring from the labor force. Human capital is
assumed to be constant over the entire working period. The labor force participation rate is constant
over the work life as well, but it can depend on the level of schooling. So, in order to calculate human
capital and years of schooling in the labor force, we weight the cohorts by their relative population
size and relative labor force participation rate, l given by
Nt+20lt = xt(1− δt)Ntlt. (1.15)
For labor force participation rates, we use the same measure as Turner et al. 2007. For workers with
more than secondary schooling, τt ≥ .3, we assume labor force participation rate, lt, of 0.91. For
workers with less than full primary schooling, τt < .2, we assume labor force participation rate of
0.60. Finally, for workers with exposure to secondary school, but less than high school graduate,
.2 ≤ τt < .3, we assume labor force participation rate of 0.82. The average years of schooling thus
obtained is compared in year t with actual observations in year t available from Tamura et al. (2019).
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1.6 Results and Discussion
1.6.1 Goodness of Fit and Growth Rates of Output per Worker
In this section, we formally evaluate the model solutions with actual observations. Figures
1.1 to 1.16 contain the data and model solutions for children ever born, years of schooling in the labor
force, output per worker, and schooling of the youngest cohort. The plots are arranged alphabetically
by country. In order to evaluate the performance of our model, we run the regression
yt = α+ βxt (1.16)
where yt is year t observation on either children ever born or average years of schooling in the
labor force or schooling of the youngest cohort or ln(real output per worker); xt is the year t model
children ever born, or the model average years of schooling in the labor force between the ages of
20 to 65, or model schooling of the youngest cohort, or model ln(output per worker). Under the null
hypothesis that the model fits the data perfectly, α equals 0 and β equals 1.
Table 1.2 contains the regression results. The row marked with p in each table denotes the p
value of the joint hypotheses. In each of these regressions, we allow for heteroskedasticity and panel
auto-correlation. The model does an excellent job of fitting total fertility and the average years of
schooling. The first two columns of Table 1.2 presents the regression results on fertility and average
years of schooling in the labor force. The coefficient on fertility is 0.91 and the coefficient on average
years of schooling is 0.97. The constant terms are 0.31 and 0.27 respectively. The closeness of the
coefficients to 1 and the constant terms to 0 implies that the model fits the data very well. The
third column reports the results for schooling of the youngest cohort, the coefficient for which is also
quite high, about 0.73. The fourth column reports the results for log income per worker, and the
slope coefficient is very close to 1, about 0.97, with constant term also very close to 0.
Table 1.3 reports the regression results of growth rates of income per worker against the
model income per worker. The coefficient is quite high, 0.80, and highly significant. It is also worth
mentioning that nowhere in our calibration exercise do we choose our parameters to directly fit the
data on income per worker. So, the fact that not only is the level but also the growth rates of
log of income per worker highly correlated with the data counterpart implies that the mechanism




Another important result of the calibration exercise in this chapter is that we identify a fall
in the price of housing space as the leading cause of baby boom. In addition, we identify a concurrent
fall in the cost of schooling to explain the rise in years of schooling observed during baby boom years.
Appendix A reports the time series of rental price, schooling efficiency, and the taste parameter, νt
and βt, consistent with the time series of total fertility rate and average years of schooling in the
labor force. All countries that experienced baby booms in our sample also saw a decline in the price
of housing space during the decade of the baby boom. It is also the case that there was a reduction
in the cost of schooling, κt during the baby boom years for the countries experiencing baby booms.
1.7 Conclusion and Future Work
As in Tamura (2006) and Tamura and Simon (2017), this paper provides provide further
empirical support to the decline in mortality risk as an important trigger for demographic transition.
In particular, we find that the decline in mortality can explain the decline in fertility and a secular
rise in human capital investment observed in the developed countries. What parents care about is
expected net fertility, and as mortality falls, gross fertility falls. The fall in gross fertility allows
parents to spend more resources per child thereby raising the child’s human capital. The model can
not only fit the time series of fertility and years of schooling across the 16 rich countries extremely
well, the out-of-sample model prediction of output per worker for these countries are also highly
correlated with the data. Using the model, we also identify a decline in the price of housing space
as the principal cause of baby boom. The concurrent fall in the cost of schooling is also identified in
this paper to explain the secular rise in the average years of schooling in the labor force. Extension
of this work will include calibrating this model to middle-income and low-income countries.
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Table 1.1: Parameter Values & Calibration
parameter value parameter value parameter value
α 0.275 µ 0.085 A 1.55
ψ 0.660 τ 0.38125 p 1.000
ϕ 0.550 a 0.40073833 r 1.529679
θ 0.125 Λ 2.014672872
Calibration
variable model min max avg notes
fertility 2.00 1.4 2.1 1.8 HDR 2014
schooling 15.25 13.0 15.2 14.0 Tamura et al. (2019)
annual growth rate 1.80% 1.80% US 1840-2000
1HDR 2014 : Human Development Report 2014.
2The growth rate is given by ln(Aτµ)/20. Annual growth of real output per worker from 1840-2000, Turner,
Tamura, and Mulholland (2013).
2OECD Better Life Index.
3Penn World Tables.
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Table 1.2: Pooled Regression Results of Actual Observations on Model Solutions
Total fertility Rate Average Years of schooling Young Schooling ln(Income)
β 0.9144*** 0.9645*** 0.7287*** 0.9710***
(0.0296) (0.0129) (0.0302) (0.0245)
α 0.3089*** 0.2665*** 1.5739*** 0.2102***
(0.0903) (0.0798) (0.243) (0.2286)
R̄2 0.9322 0.9836 0.8006 0.9211
N 479 369 369 339
p 0.0038 0.0045 0.0000 0.3724
Table reports pooled regressions with clustered errors on the country. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The
row, marked p, is the p-value on the null hypothesis that β = 1 and α = 0.
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Table reports fixed effects regression
of growth rates of output on growth
rates of model human capital.*** 1%,
** 5%, * 10%.
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1.8 Model Series and Actual Series
Figure 1.1: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): Austria
Figure 1.2: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): Belgium.
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Figure 1.3: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): Canada.
Figure 1.4: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): Denmark.
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Figure 1.5: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): France.
Figure 1.6: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): Finland.
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Figure 1.7: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): Germany.
Figure 1.8: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): Ireland.
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Figure 1.9: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): Italy.
Figure 1.10: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): Japan.
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Figure 1.11: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): Newzealand.
Figure 1.12: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): Norway.
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Figure 1.13: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): Sweden.
Figure 1.14: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): Switzerland.
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Figure 1.15: Fertility, schooling, real output per worker, young schooling (clockwise): The United
Kingdom.






Learning (with Dr. Scott Baier)
2.1 Introduction
The gravity model, often referred to as the workhorse model in international trade, has been widely
used to study the effects of various determinants of trade flows across countries. Drawing from the
analogy of physical science, Tinbergen (1962) first used gravity equation to evaluate the impact of
free trade agreements (FTAs) on bilateral trade flows. Since Tinbergen (1962), numerous papers
have studied the role of various determinants of trade flows, such as adjacency, common language,
presence of a bilateral agreement, past colonial links, to name a few, cf., Head and Mayer (2014)
. However, challenges abound in properly estimating the impact of free trade agreements on trade
volumes. Broadly, there are two challenges that researchers ought to address to quantify the impact
of FTAs accurately. We will now summarize the challenges and present the contribution of this
paper in light of these challenges.
The first challenge is that trade policies can be potentially endogenous. Two countries are
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more likely to enter into a trade agreement if they are already significant trading partners. The pos-
sible reverse causality implies that trade policy variable is endogenous thereby making identification
challenging. Another possible source of endogeneity is when trade policies are correlated to unmea-
surable trade costs between the two countries, which may induce the two countries to “self-select”
into a free trade agreement (see Baier and Bergstrand (2007) for a detailed analysis of the sources
of endogeneity).
Several studies identify the issue of endogeneity and show that the estimates that do not
allow for simultaneous determination of trade policy and trade flows are highly underestimated, cf.,
Trefler (1993), Lee and Swagel (1997), Baier and Bergstrand (2007). Trefler (1993) shows that when
trade policy is modeled endogenously, by allowing for the simultaneous determination of imports
and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the US manufacturing, the restrictive impact of NTBs increases
tenfold. Lee and Swagel (1997) also find that the exogenous treatment of trade flows and the presence
of FTA leads to an underestimation of the role of FTAs.
Prior to Baier and Bergstrand (2007), most studies that recognized endogeneity either used
instrumental variable or control function techniques in cross-sectional data. Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) show that the estimates obtained using cross-section instrumental variable and control func-
tion approaches are unstable in the presence of endogeneity. They show that using panel data with
country-pair fixed effects accounts for endogeneity and leads to an unbiased estimation of the impact
of FTAs. They find that an FTA will on average increase two member countries trade by about 86
percent after 15 years, six times the effect using OLS.
Another important consideration in properly estimating the impact of FTAs is that there
exists an extensive heterogeneity across FTAs in terms of treaty design, coverage areas of trade
policies, legal enforceability, and even the overall objectives. Consider, for example, the India-Bhutan
Free Trade Agreement and the NAFTA. The former does not go beyond commitments in tariff
liberalization in goods, whereas the latter covers commitments in a wide array of topics including
goods and services liberalization, investment liberalization, environmental and labor standards, to
name a few. The motive of signing free trade agreements can also differ across country pairs. Rosen
(2004) provides evidence that the US-Israel Free Trade Agreement and the US-Jordan Free Trade
Agreement are means of using trade policy to pursue foreign policy objectives.
Unlike endogeneity, capturing heterogeneity in trade agreements remains a challenge in the
literature. The most common approach is to treat the existence of a free trade agreement between
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trading partners as an indicator variable to estimate the common average effect across agreements,
cf., Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Anderson, Milot, and Yotov (2011), Anderson and Yotov (2016).
This methodology, however, cannot take into account the fact that FTAs differ extensively in terms
of the scope and the level of integration commitments between the parties.
The second approach involves what Kohl, Brakman, and Garretsen (2016) call a “specialist”
approach, in which researchers examine the effect of individual FTAs on the members’ trade volumes.
At best, researchers restrict themselves to a small number of trade agreements in a geographical
region with a shorter time horizon. As such, the generalizations from these studies can be difficult,
and the policy implications might be limited.
Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) provide the first evidence of the differential effects of
trade agreements, which is not restricted to a geographical region. They categorize a large number
of trade agreements based on their level of economic integration namely, non-reciprocal preferential
trade agreements, reciprocal preferential trade agreements, free trade agreements, customs unions,
common markets, and economic unions based on the traditional definition by Frankel, Stein, and Wei
(1997). Using gravity model of trade flows, they show that more comprehensive trade agreements
result in more trade creation.
The commitments in modern trade agreements, however, go far beyond tariff barriers or
factor market integration and incorporate numerous policy areas that may affect the overall bilateral
trade costs among member countries. For example, Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir (2010) examine the
content of 14 EC and 14 US trade agreements by going through the 28 agreements in their entirety
and identify up to 52 policy areas included in the trade agreements signed by the EU and the US.
This suggests that examining the differential effects of trade agreements requires a detailed analysis
of these extensive set of policy areas.
Kohl, Brakman, and Garretsen 2016 is the only study that examines the coverage and re-
strictiveness of policy provisions in trade agreements. The authors of Kohl, Brakman, and Garretsen
(2016), KBG hereafter, read through 296 trade agreements and quantify them based on the 17 policy
areas they cover and the legal enforceability of these provisions. For each provision, a score of 0 is
assigned if the document does not include the provision, 1 if it does include the provision, and 2 if
it includes the provision and the provision is also legally enforceable. They then add up these scores
and obtain a composite score for each trade agreement.
While highly informative and distinct in its approach, KBG study suffers from a few prob-
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lems, and our paper by using a machine learning approach mitigates those problems. First, the
assignment of 0, 1, and 2 seems quite ad-hoc, and a score of 2 does not necessarily imply that the
provision is comprehensive. In KBG study, a score of 2 is assigned as long as a policy provision is
covered and if there is a binding word such as “shall” or “must” present within the provision regard-
less of the specificity and the comprehensiveness of the provision. In this paper, we use techniques
grounded in the distribution of words and phrases in trade agreements to examine the comprehen-
siveness of coverage areas and their legal enforceability. Second, with KBG approach, there must
be many provisions which are in the border of being between 0, 1, and 2. Using machine learning
techniques, we will be able to keep judgment calls at bay. Besides, we will be able to capture nu-
ances that Kohl’s approach might have missed. Third, KBG adds up scores across all provisions and
obtains a composite score as a measure of “depth” for each agreement. Adding up scores across all
provisions may not be prudent because not all provisions are trade-promoting; some provisions may
be trade-restricting as well. Instead, the clustering techniques we use in this paper mitigates this
problem. Finally, KBG study only examines the coverage and the enforceability of 17 trade policy
areas. Our study examines 37 policy areas, more than twice the number of policy areas covered by
KBG study.
In this paper, we proceed in three steps. First, we classify trade agreements into distinct
clusters using k-means clustering, an unsupervised learning method. Second, we use multi-label
classification, a supervised learning method, to examine the nature of each cluster in terms of the
coverage and comprehensiveness of specific trade-policies of interest. It turns out that the groupings
of trade agreements obtained from clustering in the first stage carry economic interpretation. The
clustering exercise can separate shallow agreements from deep agreements quite well. Third, we then
run the gravity model of trade regression and find evidence that the trade agreements that cover a
wide range of trade-policy areas with high legal enforceability lead to the most substantial impact
on trade flows. Our approach also allows us to identify the provisions that have the strongest impact
on trade creation. These provisions are anti-dumping, capital mobility, competition laws, customs
harmonization, dispute settlement framework, e-commerce, environment, export restrictions, import
restrictions, institutional arrangements, intellectual property rights, freedom of transit, investment,
labor, public procurement, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, liberalization of services trade,
subsidies and countervailing measures technical barriers to trade, telecommunications liberalization
as well as transparency. These results have far-reaching implications in shaping modern trade policy
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institutions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 explains the data used in the analysis.
Section 2.3 and 2.4 present discussions on clustering and classification, respectively. Section 2.5
and 2.6 discuss the gravity model of trade flows as applied in the context of our study. Section 2.7
provides the main empirical results and findings, and section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Data
We use a total of 290 FTA texts in our analysis. The trade agreement documents, as well
as data on relevant bilateral country pairs, come from Baier and Bergstrand (2017)1. The complete
list of 290 trade agreements is listed in Appendix A. We remove annexes, protocols, and schedules
and focus on the main body of the text to ensure that our clustering results are not driven by the
mere presence of schedules, protocols, and annexes.
2.3 Clustering
The application of machine learning methods requires conversion of trade agreement texts
to numerical vectors. We remove punctuation, symbols, numbers, and white spaces and segment
trade agreements texts into single words and two-word phrases. We then count the frequency of a
single word and two-word phrases within a trade agreement and normalize the frequency by the size
of the document. Essentially, each trade agreement is uniquely represented by a vector of normalized
frequencies of single words and two-word phrases. Appendix B discusses the methods in detail.
The goal of a cluster analysis is to find natural groupings of objects based on a number
of object features. The first stage of clustering involves determining an “appropriate” number of
clusters, and the second stage involves grouping the trade agreements into the identified number
of clusters. We use one of the most widely used clustering techniques called k-means clustering
algorithm, and apply standard procedures in choosing the proper number of clusters by minimizing
the sum of squared errors between the empirical mean of a cluster and the objects assigned to that
cluster over all clusters.
We will now formally introduce k-means algorithm. Let X = {xi}, xi ∈ RD, be the set of
1The database is available at: https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/29762
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trade agreements to be clustered into a set of K clusters, C = {ck : k = 1, ..,K} where D is the
number of features per trade agreement. Assume a-priori that there exists K clusters with cluster








The implementation of this optimization takes place in the following steps.
1 Choose an initial number of clusters, k.
2 Initialize cluster centers µ1, µ2, ..., µk arbitrarily.
3 Given the fixed cluster centers, choose optimal group assignment for each data point (trade
agreements) xi based on the closest cluster center.
4 Update µ1, µ2, ..., µk on the basis of group assignments of xi.
5 Repeat steps 3 and 4 until convergence i.e. the centroids of the cluster do not move.
We repeat the above steps for different values of K and choose an appropriate number of clusters,
k∗.
2.3.1 Optimal Number of Clusters
We use two techniques commonly used in the literature to determine the appropriate number
of clusters. The first method is known as ”Elbow Method”, where within groups sums of squares is
plotted against the number of clusters. If the plot resembles an arm, then the ”elbow” on the arm
is the appropriate number of clusters. Figure ?? plots the within groups sum of squares against the
number of clusters. The appropriate number of cluster as suggested by elbow method is anywhere
between 5 to 7. It is not always the case that the plot resembles a perfect elbow as is the case with
our analysis. Therefore, it is worth employing a second technique as a robustness exercise.
Gap statistic developed by Tibshirani, Walther, and Hastie (2001) is a more sophisticated
approach to determine the optimal number of clusters. For all clusters, the gap statistic compares the
total within-cluster variation for different values of k with their expected values under null reference
2Although we assume that there exists K centers, we will eventually update this based on the value of our loss
function.
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distribution of the data. The reference dataset is generated using Monte Carlo simulations where
the reference data are obtained by uniformly sampling from a bounding rectangle of the original




where E∗n denotes the expectation under a sample size n from the reference distribution, and Wk is
the sum of within cluster variation across all k clusters. Figure ?? plots the gap-statistic against the
number of cluster and the optimal number of clusters suggested by this approach is 6. Throughout
the rest of the paper, we will present results for when trade agreements are split into both 5 and 6
clusters. The results are quite consistent across both cases.
2.3.2 Six Clusters vs Five Clusters
As we move from 6 clusters to 5 clusters, it is natural for a few trade agreements to change
their cluster memberships. However, it would be a cause for concern if many agreements are switching
their cluster memberships. Therefore, we run the correlation between the two sets of clusters. It
turns out that the clusters are fairly stable. Table 2.1 shows the correlation matrix between the
two sets of clusters. The own-cluster correlation is pretty high for all clusters, and the cross-cluster
correlation is very low indicating that most of the trade agreements stay in their ”natural” groups
as we change the number of clusters. It is interesting to note that as we move from 6 clusters to
5 clusters, most trade agreements in the sixth cluster get merged into the fifth cluster. The cross-
cluster correlation between the sixth cluster and the fifth cluster is quite high, and the cross-cluster
correlation between the sixth cluster and the fifth cluster is very low.
2.3.3 Stability of Clustering Results
We ensure the stability of our clustering results by running 1000 iterations of k-means
clustering in the cases of both 5 and 6 clusters. We then compute the correlation between the 1000
sets of clustering results against the base clustering result that we use in this paper. In the case
of 5 clusters, the mean correlation is 0.9796, and the standard deviation is 0.0656. This indicates
that clustering results are highly stable, and trade agreements do not change cluster membership
erratically. The correlation is also quite high in the case of 6 clusters. The mean correlation is
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0.9294 and the standard deviation of 0.1513. Therefore, this makes us confident that the k-means
clustering is a promising way to find natural grouping in the trade agreements.
2.4 The Characteristics of the Identified Clusters
Thus far we have grouped trade agreements into their natural groupings. However, we have
not yet presented any insights into the actual content of the trade agreements in each cluster. We
now turn to a discussion of supervised learning method, which enables us to analyze the content of
trade agreements in each cluster.
2.4.1 Supervised Learning: Classification
Supervised learning involves inferring the function from labeled training data. The training
data comprises of a set of training examples and a label associated with each training example. Based
on the training examples and the user-specified labels for these examples, supervised learning method
infers the label for a test data. More formally, given training examples of the form (x1, y1), ...(xN , yN )
where xi is a vector of features and yi is an assigned label, the goal of a learning algorithm is to
infer a function g : X → Y and thus to predict the output label for an unseen test sample.
In the context of our study, we train our model with instances of 37 trade policy provisions
and allow the machine learning algorithm to “crawl” through each paragraph of the trade agree-
ment to estimate the likelihood of the paragraph being about one or more than one policy area.
The 37 policy areas we identify are Agriculture, Anti-Corruption, Anti-Dumping, Capital Mobility,
Competition, Consumer Protection, Cooperation in Science and Technology, Customs Administra-
tion, Dispute Settlement, E-commerce, Education and Training Cooperation, Energy, Environment,
Financial Cooperation, Freedom of Transit, Export Restrictions, Import Restrictions, Industrial
Cooperation, Investment, Institutional Arrangements, Intellectual Property Rights, Investor-State
Dispute Settlement, Labor, Money Laundering and Illicit Drugs, Public Procurement, Safeguard
Procedures, Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures, Services, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises,
State Aid, State Trading Enterprises, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Technical Barriers to
Trade, Telecommunications, and Transparency.
We train the model with examples of highly comprehensive and legally binding provisions
for each policy provision. For policy provisions that are already covered in the WTO agreements,
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we seek for commitments above and beyond the WTO agreements. For policy provisions that are
not already a part of the WTO agreements, we compare the provisions in all trade agreements and
choose the most comprehensive legally binding provisions spanning all geographic regions. What
we mean by legally binding is that the provision is very specific, the provision contains at least a
restrictive word such as “shall” or “must”, and the provision specifies the course of action in case
either party deviates from the commitment listed in the provision. This course of action may be
different than a generic dispute settlement present in the trade agreements. The following provision
below is training example for provision on Investment :
National Treatment
1. Each Country shall accord to investors of the other country and to their investments treatment no
less favourable than that it accords in like circumstances to its own investors and to their investments
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, operation, maintenance, use,
possession, liquidation, sale, or other disposition of investments (hereinafter referred to in this Chap-
ter as investment activities). Each Country shall accord to investors of the other Country and to
their investments treatment no less favourable than that it accords in like circumstances to investors
of a third State and to their investments, with respect to investment activities. Article 9.6: Perfor-
mance Requirements.
Neither Party may impose or enforce any of the following requirements, enforce any commitment
or undertaking, in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation, or sale or other disposition of an investment of an investor of a Party or of a non- Party
in its territory to:
(a) export a given level or percentage of goods or services;
(b) achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content;
(c) purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced in its territory, or to purchase goods from
persons in its territory;
(d) relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of exports or to the
amount of foreign exchange inflows associated with such investment;
(e) restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such investment produces or provides by
relating such sales in any way to the volume or value of its exports or foreign exchange earnings;
(f) transfer a particular technology, production process or other proprietary knowledge to a person
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in its territory;
(g) supply exclusively from the territory of the Party the goods that it produces or the services that
it provides to a specific regional market or to the world market.
The above paragraph is highly comprehensive about investment commitments between the
parties, and the language of the text is also highly enforceable. We feed training examples such as
the one above for each of the 37 provisions and perform a multi-label classification on each paragraph
of trade agreements to estimate the likelihood of the paragraph being about one or more than one
categories. Essentially, we find a similarity measure between an untrained paragraph and the trained
examples. Since a paragraph can be about more than just one policy domain, we also allow for multi-
label classification with a technique called cross-training (Boutell et al. (2004)). The idea is to use
paragraphs with multiple labels more than once during training. This implies that each training
example can be a positive instance for more than one category during training. We then perform
multi-label classification as 37 individual binary classification problems using a one-vs-rest strategy.
This method has been proven to be effective in classifying multi-label images in the classification
literature. So for each unit of analysis (i.e. a paragraph), we estimate the probability of the unit
being relevant in one or more than one of the 37 categories. As is common in the literature, we put
a threshold probability of 0.5 for the document to be relevant about the category at all McLaughlin
and Sherouse (2016).
We experimented with the two popular classification algorithms: K-Nearest Neighbors and
Random Forest Classifier. We evaluated the performance of both models based on macro F1-scores
averaged across all classes, the details of which will be presented in the next subsection. This process
reveals that the K-Nearest Neighbors performs superior to Random Forest Classifier. We use K-
Nearest Neighbors with 5 neighbors and uniform weights to classify our trade agreement paragraphs.
With this, a brief discussion of K-Nearest Neighbors classifier is thus warranted.
2.4.2 K-Nearest Neighbors Classifier
K-Nearest Neighbor Classifier is one of the most popular non-parametric classification algo-
rithms used in many machine learning applications. Given training data D = (x1, y1), ..., (xN , yN )
and a positive integer k where xi is a vector of features and yi represents self-assigned labels for those
34
set of features, the class prediction for a new test point x0 involves identifying the K observations
in the training data that are closest to x0. So the conditional probability for class j is given as




I(yi = j), (2.3)
where Ω represents the set of K observations closest to the x0 (Friedman, Hastie, and Tibshirani
(2001)).
2.4.3 Model Evaluation
We evaluate our models and choose the appropriate parameters by performing classification
on 5-folds cross-validated data. Cross-Validation is a model validation technique to assess the gener-
alizability of the classification results. The idea is that the training examples are further separated
into training and test set, and the classification model is estimated only on the training set. The
model is then used to predict the class of the test set.
The metric used to evaluate the classification model the macro F1-scores averaged across
all classes. F1-scores is the harmonic average of precision and recall. In binary classification setting,
precision is the percentage of selected items that are correct. So, precision is given by
True Positives
True Positives+ False Positives
. (2.4)
Similarly, recall is defined as the percentage of correct items that are selected. So, recall is
given by
True Positives
True Positives+ False Negatives
. (2.5)





This measure strikes a right balance between precision and recall. For our classification, we average
F1 scores across all classes. Table 2.2 presents average F1 scores across all classes from 5 fold cross-
validation for K-Nearest Neighbors and Random Forest Classifier with various parameter values. It
can be seen that K-Nearest Neighbors Classifier performs better than Random Forest Classifier for
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every parameter value tested. Within K-Nearest Neighbors Classifier, the model with 5 neighbors
and uniform weight performs the best classification, which is what we use for classification on our
test data.
2.4.4 Provision Scores
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 present the average provision score by cluster both in the cases of
6 and 5 clusters, respectively. In both tables, we re-arrange the clusters so that the first column
represents the average provision scores for the shallowest cluster (least comprehensive) and the last
column represents the average provision scores for the deepest cluster (most comprehensive). We
will discuss more about these results against the backdrop of gravity regression results, which is the
topic for next section.
2.5 Gravity Analysis with Cluster
In the second section, we clustered trade agreements in their natural groupings. In the
subsequent section, we delved into the actual content of trade agreements belonging to each cluster.
In this section, we combine the cluster membership information obtained from the first stage with
gravity analysis of trade flows to obtain more insights into the heterogeneous impacts of FTAs on
trade flows. The gravity regression results along with the provision-wise scores obtained from the
supervised classification method will enable us to answer policy relevant questions such as what
provisions or the set of provisions matters the most for trade flows and under what conditions.
2.6 Gravity Model
The gravity model, often referred to as the workhorse model in international trade, is widely
used to study the effects of various determinants of country pairs’ goods and factors flows. The
gravity model uses the metaphor of Newton’s Law of Gravitation and predicts that the trade flows
between two countries is directly proportional to the product of their economic sizes and inversely
proportional to the distance between their centers.3 Tinbergen (1962) use gravity equation to eval-
3In Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation, the gravitational force between the two objects is directly proportional
to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them.
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uate the effects of FTA dummy variables on trade. Despite its empirical success, the initial applica-
tions are a-theoretical. Anderson (1979) is the first study that lay the microeconomic foundations
for the gravity equation under the assumption of CES identical CES preferences across countries
and product differentiation by place of origin. The other studies that lay the theoretical groundwork
are Bergstrand (1985), Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003).
Following Hummels (2001) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007), we follow the following gravity
specification:
lnXij,t = δi,t + δj,t + χij +
K∑
k=1
FTAij,t ∗ Clusterk + εij,t, (2.7)
where the lnXij,t represents the logarithm of trade flows from country i to country j, δi,t is the
vector of exporter-time fixed effects that captures any exporter-specific factors, δj,t is the vector of
importer-time fixed effects that captures any importer-specific factors, and the vector χij denotes
time-invariant country pair fixed effects. The first two fixed effects also control for ”multilateral
resistance” first introduced by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), where they argue that trade
flows between two countries not only depend on the bilateral trade barriers but also on the trade
resistance across all trading partners. As shown in Baier and Bergstrand (2007), the country pair
fixed effects will take into account any possible endogeneity of free trade agreements. FTAij,t is a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if country i and country j have an FTA between them and
a value of 0 otherwise. Clusterk is also a dummy variable and takes a value of 1 if FTAij,t belongs
to cluster k. K is the total number of clusters.
We run model specification (2.7) for two different sets of clustering results: one for 6 clusters
as suggested by the gap statistic, and one for 5 clusters for robustness purposes.
2.7 Results and Discussion
After performing the above text mining exercises along with the gravity analysis of trade
flows, we have a compelling way to answer the following questions. Do more comprehensive agree-
ments result in more trade creation? What trade policy provision or what set of trade policy
provisions matter the most for trade flows?
The first column of 2.5 shows the gravity trade regression results with 6 clusters, and
Table 2.3 shows the average cluster scores for each provision in the case of 6 clusters. The gravity
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results indicate that the most comprehensive set of agreements, denoted by deepest, have the largest
impact on trade flows. The coefficient for this cluster is about 0.83. This indicates that the most
comprehensive trade agreements can increase two members’ trade flows by up to 130% ( e0.83 = 2.30).
The prominent provisions in the deepest cluster are anti-dumping, capital mobility, competi-
tion laws, customs harmonization, dispute settlement mechanism, e-commerce, environment, export
restrictions, import restrictions, institutional arrangements, intellectual property rights, freedom of
transit, investment, labor, public procurement, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, liberalization
in services trade, subsidies and countervailing measures technical barriers to trade, telecommunica-
tions liberalization, and transparency.
The most comprehensive set of agreements remains the most influencing in terms of its
impact on trade flows as we split trade agreements into only 5 clusters. The second column of Table
2.5 shows the gravity trade regression results with 5 clusters. The FTA coefficient is 0.58. The
coefficient falls because as we decrease the number of clusters to 5, the trade agreements that are
relatively less comprehensive, yet very similar, compared to the deepest cluster also get grouped into
the same cluster. Nevertheless, the prominent provisions present in these clusters are the same as
evidenced by high scores on the same set of provisions in Table 2.4.
The FTA coefficients for the next two most comprehensive set of trade agreements, denoted
by deeper and deep in the first column of Table 2.5, are also high. The coefficients are 0.49 and
0.55, respectively. The coefficient is 0.57 in the case of 5 clusters. Examining the provision scores
reveals that the same set of provisions that were present in the most comprehensive agreements are
also dominantly present, albeit with relatively lower scores as expected.
Our results also indicate that shallow agreements, in general, have a meager impact in
creating trade flows. The only exception is the shallowest group when we split the agreements into
6 clusters. The FTA coefficient is 0.41. But as we split the agreements into only 5 clusters, the
coefficient for the shallowest group also falls. This indicates that grouping the trade agreements into
5 clusters may suffice.
2.7.1 Correlation of Provision Scores
We perform correlation on all of our provision scores simultaneously to understand how
provisions co-occur in trade agreements. Figure 2.3 represents the correlation matrix heat map. Dark
red cells represent a very high positive correlation whereas white cells represent zero correlation.
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There are a few sets of provisions that stand out in terms of their high correlation. There is a
strong evidence that the provisions on anti-corruption, e-commerce and environment tend to co-
occur together. Similarly, the provisions on dispute settlement framework, investment, investor-
state dispute settlement, public procurement, services and technical barriers to trade also tend to
appear together. There are also some provisions for which the correlation with other any provision
is almost zero. Provisions on measures on money laundering and illicit drugs, small and medium-
sized enterprises, and cooperation on education and training do not have any discernible pattern to
co-occur with other provisions.
2.8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we capture heterogeneity in free trade agreements using the tools of machine
learning. The tools of machine learning allow us to quantify several features of trade agreements,
including comprehensiveness and legal enforceability of provisions. First, we employ unsupervised
learning techniques to categorize agreements into 5 to 6 clusters. Second, we use supervised learning
techniques to analyze the content in each cluster in terms of the coverage of policy areas and the legal
enforceability of those provisions. Finally, assuming that the trade flow effects are common across
agreements within each cluster, we run the gravity model of trade flows to estimate the differential
effects of free trade agreements. We find that more comprehensive agreements result in larger trade
creation. In addition, we also identify the provisions that are generally the most successful in driving
trade flows. The provisions are anti-dumping, capital mobility, competition, customs harmonization,
dispute settlement mechanism, e-commerce, environmental standards, export restrictions, freedom
of transit, import restrictions, institutional arrangements, intellectual property rights, investment,
labor standards, public procurement, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, services, subsidies and
countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade, telecommunications, and transparency.
One crucial question that remains unanswered is whether the benefits of incorporating the
”trade-inducing” provisions that we identify in our paper extend to an arbitrarily chosen pair of
countries. Under what set of country characteristics can a randomly chosen pair be expected to
benefit the most from including the same set of provisions in a newly minted trade agreement?
In future work, we will address this question by simultaneously exploring the relationship between
country characteristics, policy provisions, and trade flows.
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Another question that is worth exploring is how the content and legal enforceability of
specific provision or a set of provisions affect trade flows in the relevant sector. For example, what
aspects of provisions related to automobiles affect the trade flows in automobiles across the member
countries? Is one method of rules of origin determination for tariff concessions more restrictive and
trade hindering than the other? The answers to such questions may also be obtained by combining a
standard empirical model of trade with the text analysis of provisions enabled by machine learning.
I believe that this stream of research will have far-reaching implications in shaping modern trade
institutions.
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Table 2.1: Correlation between the two sets of clusters
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
Cluster 1 0.92 -0.23 -0.18 -0.32 -0.24
Cluster 2 -0.21 0.86 -0.13 -0.24 -0.17
Cluster 3 -0.16 -0.12 0.96 -0.24 -0.13
Cluster 4 -0. -0.31 -0.23 0.92 -0.32
Cluster 5 -0.15 -0.12 -0.01 -0.24 0.61
Cluster 6 -0.18 0.05 -0.11 -0.28 0.65
This table shows the correlation matrix between the two sets of clusters. The highlighted values
represent the own-cluster correlation. A high own-cluster correlation value represents that the trade
agreements do not change their groups drastically as we split trade agreements from 6 clusters to 5
clusters.
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Table 2.2: Macro F1-Scores by Model: Classification
Model Average Macro F1 scores
K-Nearest Neighbors, weight= uniform and K= 7 0.8366
(0.0696)
K-Nearest Neighbors, weight= distance and K= 7 0.8160
(0.0704)
K-Nearest Neighbors, weight= uniform and K = 6 0.8243
(0.0632)
K-Nearest Neighbors, weight= distance and K = 6 0.8214
(0.0635)
K-Nearest Neighbors, weight= uniform and K= 5 0.8373
(0.0649)
K-Nearest Neighbors, weight= distance and K = 5 0.8123
(0.0649)
Random Forest Classifier, number of trees=5 0.5712
(0.0704)
Random Forest Classifier, number of trees=10 0.5388
(0.0635)
Random Forest Classifier, number of trees=15 0.5991
(0.0628)
1. F1 scores are averaged across all classes based on 5-fold Cross Validation.
2. For K-Nearest Neighbor model, represents the number of neighbors used.The weight parameter
of distance indicates that within a class, closer neighbors will have a greater influence than neighbors
which are farther away.
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Table 2.3: Provision Scores for Number of Clusters = 6
Provisions Shallowest Shallow Moderate Deep Deeper Deepest
Agriculture 0.25 0.67 0.74 0.67 0.54 0.44
Anti-Corruption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.05 0.27
Anti-Dumping 0.08 0.50 0.28 0.33 0.63 0.79
Capital Mobility 0.11 0.58 0.22 0.87 0.78 0.93
Competition 0.17 0.45 0.55 0.54 0.69 0.71
Consumer Protection 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.28 0.16 0.16
Customs Administration 0.30 0.63 0.10 0.83 0.83 0.98
Dispute Settlement 0.28 0.73 0.36 0.81 0.88 0.98
E-commerce 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.52 0.35 0.60
Education & Training Cooperation 0.02 0.21 0.03 0.17 0.32 0.24
Energy 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.15 0.16 0.19
Environment 0.05 0.21 0.08 0.65 0.39 0.63
Export Restrictions 0.69 0.91 0.88 0.93 0.88 0.95
Financial Cooperation 0.05 0.27 0.04 0.20 0.23 0.11
Freedom of Transit 0.20 0.31 0.03 0.57 0.36 0.59
Import Restrictions 0.70 0.89 0.86 0.92 0.90 0.97
Industrial Cooperation 0.13 0.29 0.05 0.23 0.33 0.24
Institutional Arrangements 0.37 0.72 0.94 0.66 0.78 0.65
Intellectual Property Rights 0.30 0.54 0.80 0.68 0.65 0.77
Investment 0.11 0.34 0.10 0.71 0.57 0.85
Investor-State Dispute Settlement 0.05 0.27 0.05 0.76 0.57 0.70
Labor 0.03 0.45 0.06 0.83 0.76 0.92
Money Laundering/Illegal Drugs 0.01 0.21 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.16
Political Dialogue 0.16 0.34 0.21 0.27 0.22 0.11
Public Procurement 0.06 0.40 0.48 0.75 0.55 0.81
Safeguard Procedures 0.20 0.71 0.97 0.68 0.66 0.61
Sanitary &Phyto-Sanitary Measures 0.13 0.39 0.41 0.65 0.58 0.77
Science and Technology Cooperation 0.12 0.23 0.05 0.36 0.49 0.40
Services 0.09 0.43 0.03 0.72 0.67 0.93
Small & Medium Sized Enterprises 0.03 0.20 0.05 0.13 0.23 0.16
State Aid 0.17 0.40 0.53 0.49 0.42 0.36
State Trading Enterprises 0.21 0.44 0.72 0.63 0.47 0.59
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 0.08 0.44 0.40 0.45 0.47 0.47
Technical Barriers to Trade 0.21 0.59 0.36 0.68 0.71 0.88
Telecommunications 0.01 0.16 0.00 0.68 0.32 0.83
Transparency 0.00 0.51 0.06 0.90 0.86 0.93
Transportation Infrastructure 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.18 0.21 0.16
Notes: Table reports the average provision scores across trade agreements within each cluster in the case of
6 clusters. Low provision scores across all clusters implies that the provision is only prevalent in a few trade
agreements.
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Table 2.4: Provision Scores for Number of Clusters = 5
Provisions Shallowest Shallow Moderate Deep Deepest
Agriculture 0.25 0.66 0.70 0.67 0.49
Anti-Corruption 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.37 0.15
Anti-Dumping 0.2 0.79 0.79 0.60 0.83
Capital Mobility 0.09 0.55 0.25 0.87 0.89
Competition 0.19 0.49 0.51 0.57 0.70
Consumer Protection 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.28 0.16
Customs Administration 0.26 0.69 0.14 0.85 0.90
Dispute Settlement 0.27 0.78 0.36 0.82 0.92
E-commerce 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.56 0.44
Education and Training Cooperation 0.02 0.21 0.04 0.16 0.30
Energy 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.17 0.17
Environment 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.65 0.51
Export Restrictions 0.69 0.91 0.85 0.92 0.93
Financial Cooperation 0.02 0.25 0.06 0.19 0.19
Freedom of Transit 0.17 0.29 0.06 0.59 0.48
Import Restrictions 0.69 0.91 0.85 0.92 0.93
Industrial Cooperation 0.09 0.24 0.10 0.24 0.30
Institutional Arrangements 0.34 0.75 0.90 0.64 0.73
Intellectual Property Rights 0.28 0.57 0.77 0.70 0.70
Investment 0.10 0.34 0.12 0.74 0.70
Investor-State Dispute Settlement 0.04 0.29 0.07 0.78 0.62
Labor 0.03 0.46 0.06 0.84 0.87
Political Dialogue 0.14 0.29 0.22 0.25 0.19
Public Procurement 0.02 0.64 0.58 0.78 0.78
Money Laundering/Illicit Drugs 0.00 0.19 0.05 0.11 0.15
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 0.03 0.19 0.05 0.15 0.20
Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures 0.13 0.45 0.38 0.68 0.64
State Trading Enterprises 0.19 0.45 0.68 0.63 0.52
Safeguard Procedures 0.21 0.71 0.90 0.66 0.65
Science & Technology Cooperation 0.10 0.27 0.07 0.40 0.43
Services 0.07 0.44 0.10 0.74 0.80
State Aid 0.16 0.39 0.51 0.48 0.40
Subsidies & Countervailing Measures 0.08 0.48 0.38 0.44 0.45
Technical Barriers to Trade 0.23 0.64 0.34 0.71 0.78
Telecommunications 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.70 0.56
Transparency 0.00 0.60 0.06 0.91 0.88
Transport Infrastructure 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.18 0.19
Notes: Table reports the average provision scores across trade agreements within each cluster in
the case of 6 clusters. Low provision scores across all clusters implies that the provision is only
prevalent in a few trade agreements.
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Table 2.5: Gravity Regressions with Different Sets of Clusters















Table reports the coefficients on the gravity regression with country pair fixed effects,
country-import fixed effects, and country-export fixed effects. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Appendix A Time Series of Rent (r), κ, ν, and Mortality (δ)
Figure 4: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: Austria.
Figure 5: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: Belgium.
Figure 6: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: Canada.
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Figure 7: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: Denmark.
Figure 8: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: Finland.
Figure 9: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: France.
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Figure 10: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: Germany.
Figure 11: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: Ireland.
Figure 12: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: Italy.
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Figure 13: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: Japan.
Figure 14: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: New Zealand.
Figure 15: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: Norway.
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Figure 16: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: Sweden.
Figure 17: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: Switzerland.
Figure 18: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: United Kingdom.
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Figure 19: a) kappa and rental rate (left) b) delta and taste: United States.
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Figure 20: Parameter βt across countries
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Appendix B From Text Documents to Numerical Feature
Vectors
For either clustering or classification analysis, the text documents will first need to be
converted to a vector of real numbers. We follow a three step procedure that is commonly employed in
natural language processing literature to transform text documents to numerical feature vectors. The
first step involves assigning integer identification for each word or a two word combination, commonly
referred to as tokenization. The trade agreement documents were tokenized using unigram (single
word) and bigram counts (two word phrases). The words for tokenization are defined as sequences of
two or more alphabetic characters, excluding stop words such as pronouns, articles, and prepositions
that do not carry much meaning in differentiating one set of documents from other. We also remove
punctuation, numbers and white spaces. The second step is to count the number of occurrences
of these tokens for each document in the collection of document commonly referred to as corpus.
The final step is to normalize each document to have a feature matrix of fixed size and to weight
tokens that occur in the majority of documents with diminishing importance. We use tf-idf scheme
developed by Salton and McGill (1983) to obtain weights for each token.
To calculate tf-idf values of a token in each document, we multiply the term frequency of that token
by its idf component. This frequency is given by
idf(t) = log
(1 + nd)
1 + df(d, t)
+ 1, (8)
where nd is the total number of documents, and df(d,t) is the number of documents that contain




(v1)2 + (v2)2 + ...+ (vn)2
. (9)
After completing this 3-step procedure, we obtain a features matrix X, whose row consists
of tf-idf values of all possible tokens for each document in our corpus. Each row is also normalized
to have a unit norm which is needed to account for the fact that documents in our corpus are of
variable length. If we were to not normalize each row to a unit norm, a longer document will have
higher term frequencies and thus higher tf-idf values than a shorter document.
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